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Introduction 
Over the past decades, digital communication technologies (DCTs) have shaped the way people 
communicate and engage with each other on matters of crime and justice. With respect to 
justice in particular, the widespread use of social media and availability of mobile phones with 
embedded cameras has allowed, for example, for a greater participation of citizens in crime 
reporting and police investigations, both as citizen journalists and digilantes (see e.g. Ceccato, 
2019; Huey et al., 2013; Nhan et al., 2017). Individuals have exploited DCTs’ affordances not 
only to assist the police but also to monitor them, and therefore undertake counter-surveillance 
or—following a much used concept in the surveillance studies literature coined by Mann and 
colleagues (2003)—sousveillance (watching from below). Cameras, mobile technologies and 
social media sites have, indeed, allowed people to turn the surveillance lens back on the 
surveillers and expose police malpractices, violence and brutality. This has led to a “new 
visibility” in policing (Brucato, 2015; Goldsmiths, 2010), or a permanent visibility that is 
obtained through counter-surveillance and sousveillance tactics (Bradshaw, 2013). 
The affordances of DCTs have also been exploited by networked social movements (Castells, 
2012; Powell et al., 2018), which have used them not only to visually expose police brutality 
and the repression of dissent (see e.g. Bonilla and Rosa, 2015), but also, and more generally, 
to campaign and raise awareness of protests (Theocharis et al., 2015; Vicari, 2013). 
Environmental movements are no exception to this trend: visual and textual material posted by 
them on social media have facilitated the emergence of unrecognised forms of environmental 
and ecological crimes and harms, and different framings of environmental protest (XXXX, 
2018), often differing from mainstream media frames (Hulme, 2009). 
DCTs are important to on-the-ground activist practice and should be carefully considered when 
addressing environmental movements’ efforts to achieve environmental and ecological justice. 
Within criminology, the perspective of green criminology has been concerned with the study 
of crimes and harms affecting human and nonhuman species, the environment and the planet, 
ultimately seeking to spark change and restore environmental and ecological justice (White, 
2008). Quite surprisingly given its focus, this perspective has relatively understudied the 
realities of on the ground environmental resistance and environmental movements’ use of 
DCTs in their striving for justice (for a few exceptions, see e.g. Brisman, 2010; Brisman and 
South, 2013; McClanahan, 2014; Natali, 2013; Yates, 2007; XXXX, 2018). These areas of 
study are important and in need of further expansion, as they have the potential of enhancing 
our understanding of activist practice, which is in itself instrumental to achieving 
environmental and ecological justice.  
This research advances knowledge on environmental movements’ activist practice by 
exploring the reality and representations of on the ground green resistance, and their 
intersections with visual representations of protest on Twitter. To this end, the article relies on 
the case of resistance to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, commonly known as TAP, in the Salento 
area situated in the south-eastern Puglia region of Italy. Partly funded by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), the TAP pipeline is a state-authorised project that will bring natural 
gas from Azerbaijan to Italy (and through it to the rest of Europe) via Turkey, Greece and 
Albania. Building on NOTAP groups established in Melendugno and surrounding villages 
since 2012, the NOTAP Movement (and, within it, locals from different demographics and 
backgrounds) fights the building of the TAP pipeline under the motto “neither here nor 
anywhere else”.1  
Methodologically, this article relies on qualitative research involving mixed methods including 
ethnographic observations, semi-structured interviews and a visual ethnography of a large 
collection of computationally collected and categorised images posted on Twitter. Whilst 
observations and interviews allowed us to capture the reality and representations of on the 
ground environmental resistance, computational methods were used to facilitate analysis of 
online visual representations. Relying on qualitative content analysis guided in part by 
quantitative visual analysis, prominent themes in online and offline representations of protest 
were identified and compared.  
Through examining the realities and representations of on the ground NOTAP protest and their 
intersections with visual representations of protest on Twitter, this study contributes to various 
forms of criminological scholarship, including green-cultural and visual criminologies, and 
socio-spatial and digital criminologies.  
The research places itself within a green-cultural criminology (Brisman and South, 2013) 
approach, which draws attention to the “cultural significance of the environment, 
environmental crime, and environmental harm” (Brisman and South, 2013: 130, emphasis in 
the original), including everyday street-level resistance to environmental harms and their media 
representations. This research contributes to this perspective by providing empirical data on 
‘on the ground’ environmental resistance, and on activists’ representations of environmental 
harms and protest offline as well as on social media (for activists’ representations of green 
protest on social media, see also Natali, 2013; XXXX, 2018).  
Scholars working from a green-cultural criminology perspective and drawing on the emerging 
field of visual criminology (Brown and Carrabine, 2017) have emphasised the importance of 
using innovative visual methodologies to explore experiences and representations of 
environmental harm and resistance both on the ground (Natali, 2019) and on social media 
(XXXX, 2018). This research adds to this literature by using computational or, as Rogers 
(2013) put it, ‘digital’ methods to collect and cluster visual material on environmental harm 
and protest posted by activists on Twitter. In particular, our innovative approach utilised 
custom data collection software, alongside visual object detection to automatically identify the 
content of images, which in turn was used to cluster the images into descriptive themes. This 
pre-processing made large scale visual trends manageable and interpretable for qualitative 
analysis. The innovative digital methods used in this study also have the potential to inform 
future visual and digital criminological research concerned with the study of visual 
representations of crime and injustice on social media (see also Powell et al., 2018).  
Lastly, by exploring activist practice online and on the ground, this article also contributes to 
the fields of digital and socio-spatial criminology. As it will be illustrated in detail in the 
following sections, both these perspectives have acknowledged the porosity of the 
online/offline boundary and the embedded nature of technology in people’s lived experience 
of harm and (in)justice. This study contributes to this mainly theoretical scholarship by 
providing an empirical examination of the intersection between online and offline 
representations of environmental protest.  
 
 
Criminology at the online/offline intersections  
Two branches of criminological scholarship known as socio-spatial and digital criminologies 
have so far explored the role played by DCTs in the shaping of experiences of harm, (in)justice 
and counter-surveillance—experiences that are also lived by environmental activists and the 
protesters who are the focus of this article.  
Let us turn to the first branch of criminological scholarship, that of socio-spatial criminology, 
and, within it, to the group of writings that follows an “ethnographic and/or ‘cultural 
criminology’ approach” (Bottoms, 2012:450). At the start of the twenty-first century, inspired 
by the ‘spatial turn’ in social theory and, therefore, by the fertilisation of the criminological 
field through interdisciplinary insights, cultural and critical criminologists began to develop a 
more sophisticated understanding of physical space in their study of urban crime and crime 
control (e.g. Campbell, 2013, 2016; Hayward, 2012, 2016). From being solely in the 
background and taken for granted, physical space has started to be conceptualised as something 
that is shaped by its lived experience and socio-cultural factors (Kindynis, 2018; XXXX, 2018), 
and is ultimately co-produced in a continual flux (Campbell, 2013).  
In their analysis of urban ‘crime’ and ‘crime control’, some socio-spatial cultural criminologists 
have drawn attention to the understandings and representations of space by frequently 
criminalised groups (such as graffiti artists) and their spatial practices of resistance. Drawing 
on Lefebvre, Kindynis (2018), for example, conceptualised graffiti-writing as a spatial practice 
that ruptures the authoritative representations of space given from above (urban planners and 
groups with political capital) and that ultimately rewrites the space—i.e., its meanings, ways 
of seeing and navigating it. Street art and graffiti have also been considered a strategy of 
symbolic appropriation of space and opposition to the cultural homogenisation propagated 
through gentrification by ‘cultures of visual resistance’ (Naegler, 2012:16).  
Even more interestingly for our purposes, a number of cultural criminologists (Campbell, 2013; 
Hayward, 2012, 2016) have addressed urban crime in both physical and digital spaces and have 
illustrated the porosity of the online/offline boundary. Hayward (2012), for example, 
considered some of the ways in which digital technologies have allowed people to exist offline 
and online simultaneously in what he calls ‘interactional spaces’, and reflected on their 
implications for criminology. For Campbell (2013), the process of spatial meaning-making 
opened up by urban crime challenges the pre-existing, and taken for granted, affective, cultural, 
moral, and legal meanings attached to a given space. This process is also facilitated by digital 
technologies: it is, indeed, through digital mediation that crime has “capacity […] to create 
dissonant and co-present ‘interactional spaces’ (Hayward, 2012: 457) which blur the 
boundaries of actual and virtual (urban) worlds” (Campbell, 2013:34). In other words, DCTs 
are key to the challenging of dominant representations of space, which shape attitudes and 
responses to behaviour occurring in it (see also XXXX, 2018).  
On its part, ‘digital criminology’ (Powell et al., 2018; Stratton et al., 2016) is premised on the 
existence of a digital ‘society’ with blurred boundaries between online and offline experiences 
of crime and justice, and where technology and society are mutually constitutive in their nature. 
In essence, the idea is that digital technologies are deeply embedded in our lived experiences 
of crime, harm and justice, and that criminological research should account for this 
online/offline conglomerate (Brown, 2006; Powell et al., 2018; Stratton et al., 2016). Despite 
contributing important theoretical advancements, this area of criminological scholarship is 
marked by a relative lack of case studies empirically exploring the intersections between offline 
and online experiences of harm, crime, crime control and justice. One exception is work by 
Wood and Thompson (2018), who discussed the way in which speed cameras on highways are 
avoided by members of an online collective through crowdsourced countersurveillance on 
social media. Drawing on de Souza e Silva’s (2006) concept of ‘hybrid spaces’ and Foucault’s 
(1986) notion of ‘heterotopia’, Wood and Thompson (2018) used this case study to formulate 
the concept of ‘hybrid heterotopias’ – spaces that oppose the given dominant order and 
surveillance assemblage through mobile interfacing and the constant connection to the Internet 
and social media. As the authors put it, ‘hybrid heterotopias’ are “a reconfiguration, 
augmentation, and contestation of everyday spaces through interfacing with technology” 
(Wood and Thompson, 2018:33). The importance given to mobile interfacing and users’ 
constant connection to the Internet via ‘hybrid heterotopias’ allows these spaces to be aligned 
with Hayward’s (2012) idea of ‘interactional spaces’ – spaces where individuals exist offline 
and online simultaneously. 
 
Methodology 
This article explores realities and representations of on the ground environmental resistance 
and their intersections with visual representations of protest on Twitter. In the two sub-sections 
below, we include information on the methods for data collection and analysis chosen for the 
offline and online parts of the study, respectively, and consider some of the study’s limitations.  
 
Offline 
This study used ethnographic observations and semi-structured interviews to investigate offline 
realities and representations of environmental protest. Ethnographic observations relying on 
detailed field-notes were carried out over two consecutive weeks (3-17 April 2019) in the main 
areas where the protest rallies, meetings and cultural events against the pipeline have taken 
place since the start of the constructions in 2017: Melendugno’s town centre and the area of 
San Foca, which is the pipeline’s landing point in the municipality hosting the first construction 
site (Figures 5-6). Where possible (i.e, where not perceived as intrusive by the community, as 
in Natali and McClanahan, 2017), a visual ethnography (Pauwels, 2015) relying on 
photography was conducted to document visual resistance (street art, graffiti etc.). During 
fieldwork, the first author also attended four meetings and open events where the affected 
community and activists discussed topics relevant to the NOTAP protest, and carried out 
informal interviews with activists.  
The research also relied on face-to-face semi-structured interviews with six activists, including: 
three key members of the main social movements protesting against the TAP pipeline 
(Movimento NOTAP, TerraMia, Mamme NOTAP) (interviews 3,2,5 respectively); one 
technical expert appointed by the municipality to oversee the construction of the pipeline 
(interview 4); one lawyer member of the NOTAP ‘legal team’ (interview 6); and one mayor 
among those who have overtly supported the NOTAP protest (interview 1). To explore in depth 
the meanings and emotions that respondents associated with the NOTAP protest in the physical 
spaces of resistance (particularly, at the first construction site in San Foca), some of the 
interviews (1 formal and 2 informal interviews) where itinerant (Natali, 2019) or involved the 
use of the participatory research method of walking with respondents (O’Neill, 2017). The 
conducted interviews (which were all recorded and transcribed), along with the pictures taken 
during the ethnography, were content analysed through codes or categories developed on the 
ground through ‘open coding’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  
 
Online 
To explore representations of protest on Twitter, we collected tweets (#NOTAP tweets) via our 
‘Listener’ tool (see XXXX, 2018) from October 2018 until the end of June 2019 (N=22,790).2 
Twitter has been selected over other social media predominantly because of the technical 
accessibility of its textual and visual content to all users and for its key role in the development 
of counter-narratives by grassroots movements, including in the Italian context (Vicari, 2013). 
The Listener utilised Twitter’s streaming API which allows the tool to collect tweets in real-
time (including re-tweets of old posts), and the API provides easy access to associated tweet 
metadata such as the creation date, number of favourites received and most importantly, any 
URL of embedded media in the tweet.  
We have decided to focus on visual social media because of the growing importance of imagery 
on social apps and platforms not only within visual (Brown and Carrabine, 2017) and digital 
criminology (Powell et al., 2018), but also to the study of environmental harm and protest 
(Hopke and Hestres, 2018; Natali, 2019; Neumayer and Rossi, 2018; XXXX, 2018). As will 
be discussed in detail below, we explored the overall visual representations of the NOTAP 
protest on Twitter by analysing the content of all images posted during the considered time 
frame. In addition, to capture the selected visual representations of protest by activists and the 
specific uses they made of the posted images, we analysed the 14 most shared pictures and 
their visual and textual context embedded in the relevant tweets. As suggested by Neumayer 
and Rossi (2018), indeed, retweeted images are the result of a desire to select and put forward 
a specific visual representation of protest and related events.  
A key issue of working with social media images is duplication. Users share the same images 
repeatedly, and also share slight variations of the same image. De-duplication was a key step 
of the process so that we could both identify what themes were most prominent across unique 
images, and recognise the most popular image themes. Of the collected Tweets, 1,816 
contained an image URL, of these 1,322 were unique URLs pointing to different image files. 
Identifying images that were near identical but originated from different URLs posed a greater 
methodological challenge. These images were downloaded from their source servers and used 
to generate a hash (a string of characters determined by the binary makeup of the image file) 
that represented each unique image. To identify these ‘hidden duplicates’, the hashes of each 
image pair (788,140 combinations) were then compared using an implementation of 
Levenshtein distance3 to generate a hash score where 0 represents completely different images, 
and 1 represents exactly the same. Authors then manually reviewed a random sample of 100 
image pairs declaring whether the images were the same or different. This provided a ground-
truth that could be used to discern what hash score should be used as the threshold to declare 
an image pair as the same, or distinct. As shown in Figure 1, a clear demarcation arose at a 
score of 0.6, indicating that any pair with a score of 0.6 or above was likely similar images 
originating from different sources. After dropping these duplicates, we were left with a set of 
956 unique images. 
 
Insert Figure 1. 
The content of these images was then tagged using the Google Vision API, which provides 
access to Google’s pre-trained machine learning models for visual object detection. Submitting 
an image to Google Vision returns a set of keywords representing the objects predicted to be 
in the image. These predictions come with a confidence score, meaning that often the 
confidence score can be used as a proxy for prominence of the object in an image. These scores 
were used as features for a k-means clustering algorithm to group images into four distinct 
clusters. Four was chosen as the optimal number of clusters after trials of 2–20 clusters 
indicated that four clusters produced the optimal clustering as determined both through a 
silhouette validation of the model (silhouette=0.68) and qualitative appraisal of the clusters. 
Whilst the procedure produced overall coherent clusters, often a small percentage of images 
per cluster will not fit the larger overarching theme, either as outliers that do not fit into any 
cluster theme, or as images that are close to the boundary line between clusters, and are 
miscategorised. These images are noted in later analysis but generally disregarded as an 
acceptable level of error when discerning cluster themes. The resulting unique images were 
956, of which 812 were found relevant through a manual check preceding the content analysis 
(Table 1). Interpretative content analysis of assigned keywords and a visual inspection sample 
images was then used to discern cluster themes as well as filter out irrelevant images.  
Insert Table 1. 
In the second part of the analysis, we focussed on the most frequently shared images overall. 
Drawing on preceding deduplication stages we were able to accurately measure share 
frequency even if images used different URLs or had been minorly edited, grouping together 
images with a similarity of at least 75% based on the Levenshtein distance of their hashes. 
Interpretative content analysis was applied to images that had been shared at least 10 times 
(N=14) by Twitter users, and their textual and other visual material embedded in the relevant 
tweets (the analysis was also performed on the embedded links, and their related textual and 
visual content).  
To protect the anonymity of Twitter users, in line with XXXX (2018), we decided not to include 
in this article any image or direct quote to textual content (as embedded in the sampled tweets 
featuring the top used images) that would allow for the identification of these users. In the 
analysis, images—especially those not published by mainstream media such as online 
newspapers, but by private users—have been described very generally, and quotes of textual 
material (which have been translated from Italian) have been kept short not to allow for the 
identification of the tweet’s author(s).  
  
Limitations of the study  
This study is subject to a number of limitations, including the time frame of the data collection 
(2 weeks for the offline fieldwork, 9 months for the online data gathering). The online part of 
the study focused on visual content posted on Twitter under the hashtag #NOTAP, and has 
excluded text-based tweets not including one of the fourteen top circulated images. It has also 
included visual and textual content posted on other social media (mostly Facebook and 
YouTube) but only when embedded in the tweets featuring one of the most circulated images. 
As other social media, Twitter is only used by given demographics; yet, it was chosen for the 
accessibility of its content and its established reputation for the development of counter-
narratives by social movements. Other limitations relate to the computational approach to 
visual analysis: the latter allows the inclusion of visual material into the analysis of online 
discourses only at the scale of data collection made possible by social media data. The reliance 
on the Google Vision API for tagging the images meant that the tags applied are literal and 
descriptive and do not allow for more abstract conceptual tagging such as ‘violence’ or ‘power’ 
that one would expect from a qualitative analysis of visual material. Key to addressing this is 
to ensure that the computationally derived outputs are qualitatively validated, and used as a 
tool to support qualitative analysis, rather than as the result in itself. The tagger was also limited 
in its capacity to cope with poor quality pictures such as night photos or photos with difficult 
to discern subjects. Whilst some of these issues can be addressed by training your own object 
detection model, the production of suitable training data at the scale necessary is in itself a 
much larger project.   
 
 
Offline 
Through content analysis of the interviews and visual ethnography in the spaces of resistance, 
we were able to identify two recurrent themes. While one focused on the NOTAP protest—
and, in particular, its objects, characteristics, strategies and markers of visual resistance—, 
another focused on repression. These themes and sub-themes are presented in the sections 
below.  
 
Protest 
Object of the protest. Activists challenged the TAP pipeline for it being an ‘illegal’, ‘useless’, 
and an ‘harmful’ project. According to interviewees 2 and 4, it was illegal, among others, due 
to the TAP company not having properly assessed the environmental impact of the pipeline. In 
particular, the company was accused of failing to assess the cumulative impact of the micro-
tunnel (entering the coast and running under- and above the ground until the Pipeline Receiving 
Terminal in Melendugno) and other tunnels (bringing gas from Melendugno to Mesagne, 65km 
north of Melendugno, where natural gas is to flow into the Italian natural gas grid) on the 
conservation of natural habitats, which are protected by EU law.4  
The pipeline was also defined as a financial “speculation” by some respondents (N 1,5,6), and 
as “useless” by others (N 1,3,4), who did not believe it could provide enough gas to satisfy the 
annual EU demand for gas.  
Interviewees also considered the pipeline harmful to the environment (including the marine 
ecosystem), the agriculture-based local economy, and people’s health. Harm to the local 
economy (which is based on the production of olive oil) was associated with the removal of 
thousands of olive trees along the pipeline’s route. Olive trees were also said to be affected by 
xylella, an untreatable bacterial disease which—many activists thought—was “invented” by 
the TAP company or by Monsanto, respectively to facilitate the building of the pipeline or to 
have GMO varieties of olive trees resistant to the disease—and produced by them—cultivated 
in the area (interview 5; informal interviews). Olive trees, more in general, tend to bear a 
symbolic meaning to the locals: they were defined as “our history” and “our family” in informal 
interviews (see also XXXX, 2018).  
Activists also thought that the pipeline was to affect local tourism, which was another crucial 
source of income for the region, and people’s health, not least because the Pipeline Receiving 
Terminal—which experts considered at risk of explosions (interviews 1,4)—was to be located 
very close to the residential core of Melendugno. In general, the TAP pipeline was seen by 
activists as a project that did not bring benefits to the local community (in terms of e.g. 
employment opportunities); rather, it harmed the economy, the environment and people’s 
health and only represented the interests of a private company allegedly colluding with the 
“fascist” Italian state (interviews 1,4) and authoritarian regimes (Azerbaijan in particular) (see 
also XXXX, 2018). With a few exceptions, people in the area refused any monetary 
compensation for land loss offered by the TAP company and the government; as the people 
formally and informally interviewed suggested, they were fighting for their children and 
grandchildren, their land, their future (“It has become a fight for life”, interview 6).     
 
Characteristics of the protest. All interviewees described the NOTAP protest as peaceful: those 
protesting were generally families with children alongside retirees. All respondents 
acknowledged the presence within the movement of a few hotheads, whose potential for 
violence was however minimised by the majority of the group and the overall non-violent 
context within which the protest has taken place. National and local media, however, were said 
to provide a rather different representation of the movement, which was either trivialized or 
represented as “dangerous” and “anti-social”; in short, as a “public enemy” (interview 6).  
The NOTAP Movement was not described by respondents as homogeneous in its fight against 
the pipeline, but as embracing different associations (Terra Mia), groups (Mamme NOTAP), 
and individuals within them with different ideologies and ideas about the aim of the protest 
being undertaken. Some, for example, set blocking the pipeline as their ultimate goal (interview 
2), whereas others’ goals stretched well beyond the pipeline embracing any fight against 
injustices and inequalities, as caused by the global neoliberal socio-economic system (this 
ideological position was confirmed during the attended four open events organised by 
Movimento NOTAP). As interviewee 4 suggested:  
 
“We are fighting for the environmental cause but [in reality] it is about the economic system 
behind TAP […], which privatises the profits and collectivises the harms. The principal 
opposition is against the economic system”. 
 
Actions against TAP were said to be well coordinated between these groups and individuals. 
Such actions mostly included: organised patrols and various other activities (such as walks and 
‘resistant’ breakfast and lunches) to monitor the building progress at the construction sites; 
flash mobs; info-desks; and book presentations. Actions also included the Movement’s 
participation in pertinent protests taking place in the region or at the national level, also in 
coordination with other environmental movements (e.g., the March for Climate and Against 
Useless Infrastructures in Rome on 23 March 2019). During the two-weeks of fieldwork, 
among the activities that were organised by the Movement there were: a sit in by the Lecce’s 
Tribunal to protest against the start of a criminal proceeding against 25 NOTAP activists; one 
book presentation on pollution caused by the steel industry; two weekly meetings; and two 
info-desks where information on the pipeline was disseminated and money collected through 
the selling of NOTAP paraphernalia such as T-shirts, bracelets, and booklets.  
During fieldwork, the offices of the NOTAP Movement and Terra Mia were open allowing for 
the spontaneous gathering of people, especially in the evenings. According to many people 
both formally (N 5,6) and informally interviewed, the fight against the pipeline succeeded in 
strengthening social ties and increasing awareness of ecological and environmental issues, 
which was previously lacking. Another important result was identified by respondents in the 
establishment of a network of national and international associations—among the latter, there 
are not only the grassroots associations fighting the TAP pipeline in countries that are affected 
by it (Azerbaijan, Turkey, Greece and Albania), but also other international environmental 
organisations (incl. 350.org and Re:Common).      
 
Strategies against TAP. Two “concatenated” (interview 3) strategies were identified by 
activists as crucial in the Movement’s fight against the pipeline: the information collection and 
dissemination strategy, and the legal strategy. Within the first one, NOTAP activists collected 
information on, among others, the building progress at the construction sites, the violations of 
the TAP company, and police malpractice, by taking pictures and recording videos with their 
phones. Visual material thus collected was then shared by them on various social media, 
including WhatsApp groups such as those dedicated to the legal team, and to national and local 
journalists.  
As interviewee 5 put it, “we have become journalists” through social media. According to 
interviewees 3 and 5, ‘becoming journalists’ served two different needs: that of the Movement 
to speak up against the pipeline in the face of media censoring and limited coverage, and that 
of journalists—with an increasingly reduced budget for travels—to receive reliable information 
on the NOTAP protest. In relation to the latter point, consider the following quote: 
 
“We write the press release, publish in the [WhatsApp] group with journalists, and those 
goodhearted among them publish it [in the press]. We record the video and take pictures 
because they [media organisations] don’t even pay [journalists] the gasoline to come to 
Melendugno” (interview 5). 
 
The communication strategy of the Movement did not simply rely on supplying journalists with 
reliable information; it also relied on self-generated content on social media, including press 
releases, the online posting of long explanatory texts, and live streamed press conferences. As 
interviewee 3 explained, “these are new ways of doing journalism, very much handmade, 
which supersede the traditional way of doing journalism”.  
The second strategy of the Movement was the legal strategy. It mostly relied on the: filing of 
requests to access documents; reporting of violations and irregularities of the TAP company to 
the police and public prosecutors; assisting activists during criminal and administrative 
proceedings; and on the sending of petitions to relevant EU institutions (e.g., EU Commission, 
Parliament and Ombudsman). Most of these activities and legal actions, which tended to remain 
unknown to the public until they are formally filed to the relevant authorities, were supported 
by the work of university professors and lawyers, all working pro bono.  
 
Visual resistance. Opposition to the pipeline through visual resistance was manifest in all 
relevant spaces of resistance. In Melendugno at the time of the fieldwork, NOTAP flags were 
hung over two bars’ entrances and on the offices’ doors of the Movement and Terra Mia 
association (which were located at the outskirt and centre of the town, respectively). In both 
Melendugno and San Foca, NOTAP tags and graffiti were present on walls and signposts 
(Figures 2-3). NOTAP graffiti and tags were also noticed in Lecce, the provincial capital, and 
on the main provincial highways (where we counted NOTAP graffiti on 5 overpasses).  
 
Insert Figure 2. 
 
Insert Figure 3. 
 
In San Foca, banners hung by the Movement against the pipeline and tags were also found on 
a dry-stone wall in front of the first construction site (Figure 4). According to interviewee 4, 
these banners and tags are reminiscent of the Movement’s first ‘permanent garrison’ (later 
replaced by the office in Melendugno), from which activists monitored the activities taking 
place inside the TAP company’s first construction site. The culture of visual resistance 
(Naegler, 2012) produced by the combination of graffiti, tags, flags and banners in the relevant 
spaces of resistance, certainly speaks of people’s opposition to this state-authorised pipeline, 
which comes to represent a more general process of land transformation—from an agricultural 
use to an industrial one (interview 1; see also 350.org, 2019). At the same time, visible markers 
of resistance also operate as a strategy of symbolic appropriation of a space that had 
increasingly been policed (see section below on repression), and—in the case of the 
construction sites in the countryside of San Foca (Figures 5-6)—militarised (see below) and 
limited in its access to the local population.  
 
Insert Figure 4. 
 
Insert Figure 5. 
 
Insert Figure 6. 
 
 
Repression 
 
During fieldwork, formally and informally interviewed activists were very vocal about the 
harsh repression practices implemented against them by agents of plural policing, who have 
policed ‘transgressive’ or ‘troublesome’ protest (Ellefsen, 2018) since the start of the protest 
in 2017; in this case, they were the Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, DIGOS,5 
and private police. Police presence in the area was perceived as pervasive and excessive, as the 
following quote suggests:  
 
“There is DIGOS videotaping everyone, I guess I am wiretapped, and […] [they do so] at all 
events […] [where] the Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, and police in riot gear are also present. 
I want to repeat it: we had up to 700-800 police officers present on the territory in the hot 
period. […] An excessive deployment of forces to the type of protest, the number of people, 
and the type of people who attended [the protests], who were women, children, and old people” 
(interview 1).    
  
According to respondents, police intimidation and criminalisation practices included: onerous 
fines (up to EUR 3,500); violence, arrests and humiliations endured during arrest (e.g. being 
forced to kneel for a long time while handcuffed); official and unofficial cautions, which were 
also notified to three activists during the time of the fieldwork; charges for vandalism, traffic 
block, use of force against public officials, possession of dangerous weapons, or trespass—
most of which were, allegedly, invented, ill-substantiated (e.g., notified on a wrong date) or 
unnecessarily exaggerated; expulsion orders mostly for having taken part in non-authorised 
protests, or having publicly spoken at them; and place bans.  
Police were also said to check people’s ID and to videotape anyone who gets close to the 
construction sites, which were described by respondents as “militarised”: they were all 
surrounded by high fences and razor wire (see e.g. Figures 5-6), and were monitored by CCTV 
cameras and agents of plural policing—including private police. The presence of many police 
forces in and around the construction sites was also confirmed during the walking interview 
with interviewee 4, when we saw Carabinieri, DIGOS6 and private police presence at most 
construction sites. At that time, the police did not check our ID (the interviewee was a technical 
expert known to the police); however, they videotaped us as we walked around the first 
construction site, and we drove close to the site where eradicated olive trees were stored (in 
this case, the interviewee did not want to stop the car to avoid being stopped “once again” by 
the police).  
Most of the activists who we formally or informally interviewed also reported that they were 
certain that they had been wiretapped including through covert listening devices (which were 
allegedly found in the NOTAP Movement’s office, according to interviewee 3) and of having 
their social media accounts fall under the close surveillance of the police and the TAP company. 
On the activists’ account, both the police and TAP had reacted to their social media posts, for 
example by issuing warnings (the police) or press releases (TAP). Many activists also reported 
having spotted police around their home and work places and subsequently feeling insecure in 
their homes at night. Many also felt constrained in their movements as they had been banned 
from towns and cities (e.g. Melendugno, Lecce) and town areas (San Foca), or had been 
stopped by the police in every part of Italy they visited. Many young people had pending 
criminal charges, which reduced their employability in a region where unemployment levels 
among young people are already relatively high (interviews 1,6).        
According to all respondents, these techniques of repression and intimidation resembled those 
used against environmental movements in other parts of Italy (e.g. against NOTAV activists, 
who oppose the high-speed rail line connecting Lyon in France with Turin in Italy) and around 
the world.7 They described repression of dissent as a strategy typical of dictatorships, “like the 
ones in South America and Chile [in particular]” (interview 4), and of the fascist regime 
(interviews 1,2,4).  
Beyond the police, other state and law enforcement actors were also believed by respondents 
to be involved in obstructing activists’ efforts against the pipeline. The latter include public 
bodies (incl. Ministries refusing their requests to access documents), judges and, especially, 
public prosecutors, who were said to prioritise criminal proceedings against NOTAP activists 
and to be rather lax and negligent when it came to investigating reported irregularities against 
TAP (“what we’ve seen is an extreme dependence of the judiciary on politics. So it has done 
very little”, interview 4). According to all interviewees, this had the effect of delegitimising 
state authorities and the ways of delivering justice by the legal system (e.g., “Consider that I 
studied law to become a lawyer because I believed in the myth of legality.. now the system has 
rotted”, interview 6). Also the government, and particularly the Five Start Movement 
(henceforth: 5SM) within it (a populist political party running the then government in coalition 
with the Northern League), was delegitimised according to activists: contrary to the promise of 
blocking the pipeline had they been elected, this political party gave green light to the company 
to proceed with the constructions. As an activist put it during an informal conversation: “I will 
never vote for the 5 Star Movement again; I will never vote for anyone again”.   
 
 
Online  
This section focuses on the content analysis of visual representations of the NOTAP protest on 
Twitter. The content analysis of the online material is divided into two parts. In part one (titled 
‘Unique images’), we addressed the retrieved relevant 812 images as organised into four 
clusters (see Table 1) and relied on open coding (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 
1998) for the construction and refinement of codes and sub-codes (see Tables 2-5 for an 
overview of the main codes and sub-codes for each cluster). The second part of the analysis 
(titled ‘Top used images’) focused on the 14 most circulated images, as well as on their related 
tweets and their embedded visual and textual content, which allowed for the identification of 
the specific visual representations of protest selected by activists and for a more contextualised 
understanding of the symbolic meanings of pictures and their uses by activists. Both content 
analyses revealed the presence of two recurring themes in the sampled visual social media: one 
focused on the NOTAP protest, the other on opposition to politics.  
 
Unique images 
Cluster 0. The content of the majority of the 245 relevant images grouped in this cluster tends 
to be very critical of the then government—a coalition made by the 5SM and the Northern 
League (149 or 60.8%). Most of these images critique the governmental approach on TAP (46 
or 18,8%) and, particularly, the 5SM’s decision to give green light to the pipeline, despite its 
promises of stopping it after winning the elections (73 or 29.8%). The latter images mostly 
include text and photo captions criticising a number of 5SM politicians who had been 
particularly vocal about their opposition to the pipeline (e.g. “you’ve become MPs thanks to us 
now resign”, “Shame on you, you were on our side!”). Other images show poll data indicating 
a decreased appreciation of the 5SM by the general population since the 2018 election (5 or 
2%), and challenge the government on broad topics not related to TAP (e.g. TAV, vaccines, 
immigration) (25 or 10.2%).  
 
Insert Table 2. 
 
Cluster 1. This second group clusters images (No=412) mainly depicting environmental and 
NOTAP protests (285 or 69.2%). Many of these images represent public events and organised 
protests (98 or 23.8%) and portray demonstrators while e.g. marching in both urban and natural 
contexts and holding NOTAP banners as well as banners of other environmental movements 
within and outside Italy. Some images have been taken at conferences, discussions and 
meetings held indoors (30 or 7.3%). A substantial number of pictures in this cluster (157 or 
38.1%) also represent the NOTAP protest by showing, among others: olive trees (some are 
dead and cut into pieces, some others are eradicated and taken away by trucks); pipelines (these 
images tend to depict: pipes being laid down under the ground; sea gas fields; street art and 
drawings showing aggressive pipelines e.g. strangling an olive tree; and the TAP pipeline’s 
route); NOTAP flags (hang on windows, traffic signs etc.); and the militarised construction site 
in San Foca (Figures 5-6). Similar to that above, also in this cluster many pictures critique the 
5SM and the government mostly in relation to their decision to support the pipeline (106 or 
25.7%). Lastly, twenty-one images (5%) represent the police in riot gear; five of which portray 
the police cordoning off the construction site where olive trees are being eradicated. 
 
Insert Table 3.  
 
Cluster 2. The overwhelming majority of the 121 images in cluster 2 focus on protest (119 or 
98.3%). These images tend to depict public assemblies and rallies, where demonstrators of all 
ages hold NOTAP banners (61 or 50.4%) as well as banners from other Italian and international 
environmental movements (e.g., from Belgium, France, Syria, and Canada, in addition to 
groups with banners of Extinction Rebellion and #FridaysForFuture). The messages displayed 
on the banners mostly address: opposition to TAP (e.g. “No to tap neither here nor anywhere 
else”, “NO to TAP and all useless large projects”); the need to defend the planet (e.g. “defend 
your home”, and “let’s modify our lifestyle to save the planet”); and the criminalisation of 
activists (e.g. “defending the land is not a crime”). Only 2 images (1.6%) show the police in 
riot gear cordoning off the construction sites in San Foca from peaceful protesters (in one, the 
latter have their hands in the air to signify surrender).  
 
Insert Table 4. 
 
Cluster 3. This last cluster includes 34 images of newspaper articles—mostly their headings. 
For the most part (29 or 85.3%) of these articles criticise the government (7 or 20.6%) and the 
5SM’s decision to back up the pipeline, contrary to what it had promised during the electoral 
campaign (22 or 64.7%). In particular, four articles talk about a gathering in San Foca held in 
October 2018, where NOTAP activists burned their poll cards together with the 5SM flag, 
while three of them challenge the narrative used by the 5SM to motivate their approval of the 
pipeline: that of avoiding paying high penalties for an unjustified withdrawal from the contract.  
 
Insert Table 5.  
 
 
Top used images 
 
There are two main themes featuring the top 14 used images (see Table 6) and the textual and 
visual material embedded in the tweets featuring them: 1) opposition to politics (the 5SM in 
particular); and 2) the NOTAP protest. These themes parallel the ones emerging from the 
content analysis of the images grouped in the four clusters above, which mainly addressed the 
opposition to the government/5SM (clusters 0 and 3) and NOTAP and other environmental 
protests (clusters 1 and 2).  
 
Insert Table 6. 
1) Opposition to the 5SM features eight images and their related content (N 1,4,8-13). These 
images mostly depict 5SM politicians (1,4,10,11,12), their statements (9,13), and NOTAP flags 
(8). The top circulated image (Figure 7) is a vignette representing one of the leaders of the 
5SM, Luigi Di Maio, watching NOTAP activists burning the 5SM flag and calling for 
‘honesty’. This image was published by one Italian newspaper (Il Foglio) and was shared on 
Twitter 68 times. The posts containing the other images similarly attack the 5SM. For example, 
the tweets including images 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, criticise those politicians in 5SM who had 
promised to block the pipeline once in the government. The aforesaid images include pictures 
of the leader Di Maio and of the then Minister Barbara Lezzi holding, or surrounded by, 
NOTAP flags (images 10,11,12), or their pre-election statements against TAP (images 9,13), 
which are all powerful in reminding the reader of their initial opposition to TAP. These images 
are also associated in the tweets to comments such as “shame on you! You were with us” and 
“the 5SM betrays NOTAP”. Other tweets, such as those including image 8 (featuring a child 
holding a NOTAP flag), speak about activists’ burning their polling cards and 5SM’s flags 
during one of their meetings. The tweets embedding image 4 (a vignette with the leader Di 
Maio holding a game card that stands for power) joke about the alleged penalties that, according 
to the 5SM, Italy would need to pay should the pipeline be blocked—a narrative that is 
challenged by activists.  
 
Insert Figure 7.  
 
2) The NOTAP protest is the central theme in the tweets containing the remaining six pictures 
(2,3,5-7,14). The top used image in this group (N 2, circulated 66 times, see Table 6) is a photo 
caption of a newspaper heading that reads as follows: “gas will go not to Italians but to 
Germans, Austrians and Dutch people”. The text embedded in the posts featuring this picture 
speak about the “hope” of their author(s) to contribute to the “dissemination of truth” about the 
pipeline, which is indirectly described as useless for locals and Italy altogether.  
The other five top circulated images in this group depict protesters holding NOTAP banners at 
demonstrations and are mostly used to support activists’ efforts to stop the pipeline, both on 
the ground and on other online platforms. For example, tweets containing the second top 
circulated image in this group (N 3, shared 55 times), depicting activists walking together along 
the coastline and holding NOTAP banners, include two links: one to a 350.org petition calling 
on EIB to stop funding fossil fuels, and the other to a video (with English subtitles) 
summarising the two years of the NOTAP protest. In this video, images of police in riot gear 
at the first militarised construction site in San Foca and of NOTAP protesters are associated to 
the following text caption: “despite a harsh crackdown by the Italian state and police the local 
community continue to organise and speak up” (350.org, 2019). Ultimately, visuals of NOTAP 
protesters are used in these tweets to draw attention to an online petition asking EIB to stop the 
financing of the TAP pipeline (which is partially funded by EIB).  
The remaining four images (N 5,6,7,14) also depict groups of demonstrators with NOTAP flags 
and banners; tweets featuring pictures N 5, 6, and 7, also contain images of the militarised 
construction sites in San Foca (Figures 5-6). All tweets featuring these four images (N 5,6,7,14) 
sustained activists’ on-the-ground efforts to stop the pipeline: specifically, they supported the 
initiative of a local activist who went on hunger strike to block the pipeline (images N 5,6,7), 
and announced a local NOTAP demonstration (image N 14, which is an event’s flyer).  
 
At the online and offline intersections: discussion  
This article explored the realities and representations of the NOTAP protest on the ground and 
their intersections with visual representations on Twitter. The findings point at the similarity 
of these representations in their portrayal of the NOTAP protest, which both online and offline 
was presented as peaceful, opposing a useless and harmful pipeline project, and as participated 
and supported by other environmental organisations. Opposition to the pipeline was also 
reinforced through graffiti and tags in spaces of resistance, NOTAP banners and flags at 
demonstrations, and pictures thereof circulated on Twitter. As illustrated above (under the 
subsection ‘Visual resistance’), NOTAP banners, flags, graffiti and tags in physical spaces of 
resistance operated as a strategy of symbolic appropriation of space. In particular, visual 
markers of resistance were used to appropriate spaces viewed as increasingly policed, 
militarised, and with limited access opportunities for locals, such as the areas of the 
construction sites in San Foca. Images depicting NOTAP banners, flags, graffiti and tags in 
these spaces were then circulated on Twitter (see cluster 1 above), thus extending and 
amplifying the contestation of everyday spaces through the use of technology. This is in line 
with the socio-spatial and digital criminology literatures which acknowledge the important role 
played by DCTs in the channelling of counter-representations of given spatial orders 
(Campbell, 2013; Wood and Thompson, 2018). 
The use by activists of images of visual resistance on Twitter went, however, well beyond the 
contestation of everyday spaces and their underpinning spatial orders. As this study has shown, 
the sharing on Twitter of images depicting demonstrators holding NOTAP banners and flags 
served a very practical reason, relevant to activist technosocial practice: that of supporting both 
on the ground and online efforts aimed at stopping the pipeline. This finding aligns with the 
previous literature on the technosocial nature of networked social movements (Castells, 2012; 
Powell et al., 2018), which argue for the embedded nature of technology in activist practice 
and for the use by activists of different combinations of offline and online opportunities for 
activism, protest and resistance to reach the protest’s aims.  
Apart from a similar representation of the NOTAP protest, other recurrent themes tended to 
gain a different prominence on Twitter and on the ground: while repression was a prominent 
theme offline, opposition to the government—and particularly to the 5SM (a political party 
member of the then governing coalition)—emerged as recurrent on Twitter.  
On Twitter, in particular, images of peaceful protesters holding NOTAP banners and banners 
of other environmental movements taken by activists co-existed with visual material explicitly 
critical of the government and the 5SM, which is mostly challenged for not having lived up to 
its promise of blocking the pipeline once at the government. This is not an unusual use of 
Twitter by social movements, which in recent years have utilised this platform mostly to 
facilitate political discussion and to convey information on the protest (Theocharis et al., 2015; 
Vicari, 2013), which in turn supports the movement’s actions in other online platforms and 
offline channels (Theocharis et al., 2015).  
Partially different representations and realities, however, dominated activists’ on-the-ground 
narratives. Here, although the NOTAP protest continued to be a prominent theme and critiques 
to the 5SM have also emerged during fieldwork (see the sub-section on ‘Repression’ above), a 
very recurrent theme was that of repression—which was seldom present online (a reference to 
the police was only made in a few pictures in clusters 1 and 2 above, and in a video embedded 
in the tweet(s) containing the third most circulated image). During interviews and general on 
the ground fieldwork, activists’ narratives focused very much on the harsh criminalisation 
practices implemented against them since the start of the NOTAP protest. By contrast, activists’ 
lived experiences of repression and intimidation by agents of plural policing did not emerge as 
recurrent in the analysis of Twitter posts. Tweets on police repression were however very 
typical in 2017, when violent clashes between the police and protesters took place and were 
reported by activists on Twitter (XXXX, 2018). At that time, violent police repression was an 
immediately relevant issue and involved a spectacle of violence and repression, which—when 
present—tends to dominate the content of the most circulated images on protest events 
(Neumayer and Rossi, 2018). Indeed, as XXXXX (2018) indicated, visual material posted by 
NOTAP activists on Twitter in 2017 show police in riot gear violently pushing and clubbing 
activists with batons. By contrast, during the time frame considered in this research, typical 
forms of police repression did not configure such a spectacle: it was mostly expressed through 
fines, criminal charges, cautions and place bans against individual activists. We would suggest 
that repression is often only visual within certain circumstances, and much repression is 
inherently invisible until activist action, such as embodied demonstrations, coerce that 
repression to manifest as a physical and therefore visual form. Lastly, the relative lack of visual 
social media on repression in the analysed Twitter data can also be the result of intentional 
efforts by activists to avoid having their protest associated with violent acts and their grievances 
pushed in the background (see also Neumayer and Rossi, 2018). Such a dynamic would warrant 
further study to fully elaborate. 
Other important differences emerged between the online and offline parts of the study. Offline, 
for example, activists discussed their two adopted main tactics of resistance, i.e. the information 
collection and dissemination strategy and the legal strategy. These strategies did not emerge as 
obvious on Twitter. As the interviewed activists suggested, the information collection and 
dissemination strategy was based on a strategic use of technology by activists-journalists to 
channel counter-representations of environmental harm and protest, including through posts 
and live streamed press conferences on social media. This use of technology by NOTAP 
activists once again evidences the technosocial nature of networked social movements 
(Castells, 2012; Powell et al., 2018). Activists-journalists also reported having made a strategic 
use of mobile cameras, social media and apps (WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter) for the 
crowdsourced counter-surveillance of law enforcement and the TAP company, which were 
both carefully monitored in their moves. This reported use of DCTs is coherent with the notion 
of ‘hybrid heterotopia’ as elaborated by Wood and Thompson (2018), which configures 
phones, social media and apps as mediated spaces allowing individuals to enhance their efforts 
towards the challenging of highly order and controlled spaces; it also aligns with the existing 
literatures on socio-spatial and digital criminologies (e.g. Campbell, 2013; Hayward, 2012; 
Powell et al., 2018; Stratton et al., 2016), which view the online and the offline spaces as 
inextricably intertwined with vanishing or extremely blurred boundaries between them. 
Although in our research on Twitter we could not find any evidence of the use of DCTs for the 
crowdsourced counter-surveillance of police and corporate misbehaviour, some examples of 
the period prior to the data collection were pointed at us by activists.8   
In addition to this, the legal strategy, which is mostly based on the challenging of the TAP 
project’s legality and on defending criminalised activists in court, also did not emerge in the 
analysis of online material. This is quite understandable given that, as suggested by activists 
during interviews, legal initiatives tend to remain tactically hidden until the relevant lawsuit is 
filed. Fear and the affective wash shaping activists’ daily lived experiences while navigating 
the urban and natural space also remain unknown to the online user.  
In summary, this research revealed the presence of some differences between offline and online 
realities and representations of protest. Mostly, these differences were related to the inherent 
secrecy of some of the protest’s strategies (e.g., its legal strategy), and to the specific ways in 
which activists tend to use Twitter—that is, to foster debate and convey information on the 
protest’s aims and agendas (Theocharis et al., 2015; Vicari, 2013).         
The identified differences between offline and online realities and representations, therefore, 
add a nuance to the digital criminology literature that conceptualises justice as a technosocial 
practice within a digital ‘society’ of blurred boundaries between online and offline spaces 
(Powell et al., 2018; Stratton et al., 2016). As this research has shown, technology has certainly 
an embedded nature in activists’ lived experiences of (in)justice; yet, the realities and 
representations of these experiences ‘on the ground’ may not always correspond to the 
representations conveyed through DCTs, and on Twitter in particular.  
 
 
Conclusive thoughts 
By relying on the case study of the #NOTAP protest and on a mixed-method approach, this 
article analysed the realities and representations of on the ground environmental resistance and 
their intersections with visual representations on social media, and demonstrated that only a 
partial overlapping existed between them. When this overlapping was found, it mostly 
addressed information on the protest, which—both on the ground and on Twitter—was 
described as peaceful, opposing a useless and harmful pipeline project, and as participated and 
supported by other environmental organisations. Similar online and offline representations of 
the NOTAP protest through visual resistance and images thereof circulated on Twitter, also 
revealed the embedded nature of technology in activist practice. As illustrated in the article, 
indeed, images of on the ground visual resistance were used by activists on Twitter to extend 
and amplify the contestation of everyday spaces, and, most importantly, to support both on the 
ground and online initiatives to stop the pipeline.  
Yet, there were differences in the recurring themes emerging from the online and offline 
analyses. These differences had mostly to do with the inherent secrecy of some of the protest’s 
strategies (e.g., its legal strategy), and with the specific ways in which social movements tend 
to use Twitter—that is, to convey information on the protest and foster political discussion (see 
Theocharis et al., 2015; Vicari, 2013). These results, therefore, add a nuance to the digital 
criminology literature premised on the existence of blurred boundaries between online and 
offline worlds (Powell et al., 2018; Stratton et al., 2016): lived experiences of harm, control 
and justice may well be digitally mediated, yet their realities and representations on the ground 
may not always coincide with those articulated through DCTs, and on Twitter in particular.  
The findings of this research also point at the importance of combining research on visual social 
media with ethnographic fieldwork on-the-ground: while the former allows for the collection 
of information on the protest and visual political opposition, the latter captures the complex 
nuances and affective textures of lived experiences of resistance in the urban and natural space, 
which may often be neglected, or intentionally be hidden, in online spaces. Ultimately, the 
findings also suggest that within green-cultural criminology there is much scope to develop 
innovative visual and digital methodological approaches to the understanding of technosocial 
green resistance. Our hope, therefore, is that this research will inspire other case study research 
where the intersection between harm, justice and the environment will be empirically examined 
both online and on-the-ground through mixed methods and innovative visual and digital 
techniques. The use of these innovative methodologies may, indeed, go a long way to improve 
our understanding of people’s suffering, and their efforts of reducing harm to themselves, 
human and non-human species, the environment and the planet altogether.  
 
Notes 
 
1
 For the NOTAP Movement’s history, see https://www.notap.it/storia/. 
2
 The project’s toolset is available at: XXXX [to be added upon acceptance]. 
3
 https://github.com/seatgeek/fuzzywuzzy.  
4
 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora. 
5
 Polizia di Stato and Carabinieri are the two law enforcement bodies providing the main police services at the 
local level. Guardia di Finanza is a militarised police force under the Ministry of Economy and Finance, while 
DIGOS is a law enforcement agency investigating serious crime cases, involving e.g. terrorism and organized 
crime. 
6
 According to activists, DIGOS officers are recognisable for their casual clothes and their use of video cameras. 
7
 International eco-justice movements confirmed this during the international workshop on ‘Policing extractivism: 
security, accumulation and pacification’, which the Movement co-organised in Melendugno between 5 and 7 
October 2018. 
8
 For an example of crowdsourced counter-surveillance of the police, see 
http://www.lecceprima.it/cronaca/diretta-live-di-un-poliziotto-su-facebook-scatena-la-polemica-dei-no-tap.html. 
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